Interpreting the Data
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Braga et al. (2002) suggest that the three sources of data on illegal gun
markets are not directly comparable but broadly compatible. Each data
source has its own inherent limitations and, as such, it is difficult to credit
the insights provided by one source over another source.
None of the three sources of data contradicts the hypothesis that stolen
guns and informal transfers (as opposed to transfers from legitimate sources)
predominate in supplying criminals and juveniles with guns. However, they
also clearly suggest that licensed dealers play an important role and that the
illegal diversion of firearms from legitimate commerce is a problem. In their
review of these three sources of data, Braga and his colleagues (2002)
suggest that, in the parlance of environmental regulation, illegal gun markets
consist of both “point sources”—ongoing diversions through scofflaw
dealers and trafficking rings—and “diffuse sources”—acquisitions through
theft and informal voluntary sales. As in the case of pollution, both point
sources and diffuse sources are important (see also Cook and Braga, 2001).
Braga and his colleagues (2002) also speculate that the mix of point and
diffuse sources differs across jurisdictions depending on the density of gun
ownership and the strictness of gun controls.
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
General Model
Real interventions in gun markets tend to target particular types of
firearms or sources. If policy raises the difficulty (cost, time, risk) of obtaining
a particular type of gun or using a particular type of source, the effect
might be mitigated by criminals’ substitution across types of guns or sources.
The following framework is helpful for organizing what is known, and
what we would like to know, about whether access interventions can reduce
harms from criminal gun use.
There are many types of guns; the term “type” encompasses both the
literal firearm type (e.g., handguns versus long guns) and the source by
which it is acquired (e.g., retail purchase, private sale, theft, loan, and other
types of firearm transfers).3 Furthermore, there are many types of individuals
(legal possessors, juveniles, convicted felons and other persons prohibited
from legal gun possession). Restrictions aim at reducing firearm possession
or use by some of those groups. For analyzing the effects of these
restrictions, consumer demand theory provides a useful conceptual framework,
in which the use of each type of gun by each type of individual
depends on the total cost that individual incurs in acquiring or retaining
that gun. This generates a specific volume of use (possession or purchase)
by each type of individual for each type of weapon. When the difficulty
felons face in acquiring new guns rises, for example because of a targeted
intervention, we assume that new gun use will decline among felons;
whether that decline is substantial can be determined only empirically. Use
of other kinds of guns may rise.
We use the term “cost” as broader than the money required for purchase
of the item. Nonmonetary costs may be particularly important for
gun acquisition by offenders, compared with purchases of unregulated legal
goods; these costs include the time required to locate a reliable source or
obtain information about prices, the risk of arrest by police (and sanction
by a court), and the risk of violence by the seller. These are potentially
important in any illicit market and have received some attention in the
context of drug markets (Caulkins, 1998; Moore, 1973).
To make clear how this framework operates, consider an intervention
that raises the costs criminals face to obtain new guns. The direct or “own”
effect of this intervention is to reduce criminals’ demand for new guns. Yet
this is not the end of the story. The total effect of the policy intervention is
the sum of the “own effect” and a “cross-effect” reflecting criminals’ substitution
of used guns for new ones as new guns become more costly. Even
if the own effect is negative, the cross-effect might be sufficiently positive to
render the overall effect close to zero.
3For discussion purposes, we are dramatically simplifying the large variety of guns available
to consumers. Guns vary by type (revolvers, semiautomatic pistols, derringers, rifles, and
shotguns), caliber and gauge (e.g., .22, .38, 9mm, .45, 12 gauge, 20 gauge, and dozens of
other bullet calibers and shotgun gauges), and manufacturers (e.g., Smith & Wesson, Sturm
Ruger, Colt, Glock, Sig Sauer, Lorcin, Bryco, and hundreds of other manufacturers). There is
ample evidence suggesting that criminal consumers seem to prefer certain types of guns.
The patterns of substitution among sources may be different for different
types of potential buyers. Adults without felony convictions or other
disqualifications can presumably choose between buying new guns from
retailers and used guns from legal private sellers. Juveniles, by contrast,
cannot buy from retailers or law-abiding dealers in used guns. However,
they can conceivably substitute by obtaining guns from a number of sources
outside legal commerce, such as residential theft, informal transfers through
their social networks, and scofflaw dealers; as one source becomes more
difficult, youth may obtain more from another.
This framework is limited to an assessment of effects on the quantities
of guns owned, which is not the final outcome of interest. Rather, it is crime
or violence that ultimately interests policy makers. Whether changing the
number and characteristics of firearms in the hands of persons of a given
type increases harm is an additional question that requires different data
and is considered at the end of the chapter.
We classify potential market interventions in two dimensions: markettargeted
(primary or secondary) and supply or demand side programs. For
example, consider police undercover purchases from unlicensed dealers.
These aim to shift the supply curve in secondary markets by increasing the
perceived risk of sale; dealers will be less willing to sell to unknown buyers
and will charge a higher price when they do. Whether this has an influence
on criminal possession of guns depends on many factors, such as the share
of purchases that are made from nonintimate dealers and the price elasticity
of demand (i.e., how much an increase in the price affects the purchase and
retention of guns). Other interventions are focused on reducing demand,
for example, taxes on FFL sales (primary market) and increasing sentences
for purchasing from unlicensed dealers (secondary market).
Demand
What determines the demand for guns? Offenders acquire firearms for
a variety of reasons: self-protection, a means for generating income, a
source of esteem and self-respect, and a store of value. For example a rise in
violence in a specific city may shift the demand curve up because of the
increased return to self-protection. We assume that the demand for guns for
criminal purposes is negatively related to the price and other costs of acquisition;
there is no research on the elasticity with respect to either price or
any other cost component that would allow quantification of the importance
of this effect. Note that individuals make two kinds of acquisition
decisions, active and passive; passive refers to holding rather than selling a
valuable asset. Most market interventions aim only at the acquisition decision;
retention is affected only indirectly, in that an increase in the value of
a gun may lead to a greater willingness to sell to others.
Individual demand has an important time dimension to it, which makes
inconvenience of acquisition a potentially valuable goal for an intervention.
The value of a gun is partly situation-dependent; a perceived insult or
opportunity to retaliate against a rival may make a firearm much more
valuable if acquired now rather than in a few hours, when the opportunity
or the passion has passed. Analytically and empirically that is a substantial
complication; individuals are now characterized not only by their general
risk of using a firearm for criminal purposes but also by their time-specific
propensity of such use. This also allows for the possibility of positive effects
from interventions that merely reduce the fraction of time an offender has a
firearm.