ENHANCED SENTENCES FOR CRIMINAL USE OF FIREARMS
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Sentencing Enhancements for Firearm-Related Crimes
Firearms sentence enhancement laws mandate minimum sentences or
extra prison time for felonies committed with firearms. Unlike most gun
control measures, enhanced prison penalties for firearm-related crimes have
widespread support from all sides of the firearms policy debate. Firearms
sentence enhancements do not affect the ability of law-abiding citizens to
keep firearms for recreation or self-defense and have the potential to reduce
firearm-related violence by incapacitating those who have been convicted
of firearm-related crimes and deterring future firearms crimes. Although a
recent rigorous research study suggests that sentence enhancements can
result in modest crime reductions (Kessler and Levitt, 1999), the evidence
on the effects of sentencing enhancements on firearm-related crime is less
clear.1
In their examination of the case for a gun-emphasis policy in the prosecution
of violent offenders, Cook and Nagin (1979) conclude that firearms
use in robbery and assault deserves stiffer punishment because it increases
the chance of the victim’s death. In their analysis of case information, Cook
and Nagin found that, while there was little difference in recidivism rates
between gun users and those using other weapons in Washington, DC,
criminals who used a gun in one crime were more likely to be rearrested for
a firearm-related crime. Finally, they also found that, in Washington during
the mid-1970s, there was little distinction in prosecution and sentencing
between firearm-related crime defendants and other-weapon-related defendants
when controlling for other characteristics of the case. Apparently,
prosecutors had a “weapons” emphasis, but not a “gun” emphasis.
Several small-scale studies suggest that sentencing enhancements for firearm-
related crimes might reduce some types of crimes. The results of these
studies, however, are sometimes difficult to interpret. For example, McPheters
and his colleagues (1984) used interrupted-time-series analyses to evaluate
the effects of Arizona’s 1974 firearms sentencing enhancement law. They
found highly significant reductions in firearm-related robberies in Pima and
Maricopa counties and no significant firearm-related robbery reductions in
five southwestern cities outside Arizona that did not pass similar laws during
the study time period used as controls. This impact on firearm-related robberies,
however, may have been due to regression to the mean, as Arizona
experienced a 75 percent increase in firearm-related robberies in the two
years prior to the passage of the law (McPheters et al., 1984).
1Two National Research Council reports (1978, 1993) explicitly address the deterrent
effects of penalties. Both conclude that the likely effects of manipulations of the severity of
penalties are fairly small.
Loftin and McDowall (1981) examined the effects of a Michigan firearms
law that required a 2-year mandatory sentence for felonies committed
while in possession of a firearm on the certainty and severity of sentences
and on the number of serious violent crimes in Detroit. A substantial media
campaign announcing that “One With a Gun Gets You Two” preceded the
law’s going into effect in January 1977, and the Detroit prosecutor adopted
a strict policy of not plea bargaining such cases down to lesser charges.
Their examination of cases processed though the Detroit Recorder’s Court
between 1976 and 1978 found little change in the certainty or severity of
sentences for firearm-related murders and armed robberies, but they did
find that there was a significant increase in the expected sentence for firearms-
related assault cases that could be attributed to the firearms law.
Similarly, in their examination of California’s firearms sentencing enhancement
law, Lizotte and Zatz (1986) found little difference in prison
sentences given to firearm-related criminals in California, except when defendants
had three or more prior arrests. Loftin and McDowall (1981)
evaluated the crime control effects of the Michigan firearms law, again
using time-series analysis, and found no significant reductions in armed
robbery or firearm-related assaults in Detroit. They did find a significant
reduction in firearm-related homicides but concluded that the overall results
best fit a model in which the firearms law had no preventive effects on
crime. A later analysis by Loftin et al. (1983) affirmed these conclusions.
The Florida Felony Firearm Law mandated a 3-year prison sentence for
anyone possessing a firearm while committing or attempting to commit any
of 11 specified felonies. Using time-series analysis models, Loftin and
McDowall (1984) examined the effects of the October 1975 Florida firearms
law on firearm-related homicides, armed robberies, and firearm-related
assaults in Miami, Tampa, and Jacksonville. To reduce any historical
effects, nonfirearm-related homicides, unarmed robberies, and knife assaults
were used as control time series. Loftin and McDowall (1984) did
not find any significant reductions in firearm-related crime in Jacksonville
and Miami associated with the passage of the gun law. They did, however,
find a significant decrease in firearm-related homicides and a significant
increase in firearm-related assaults in Tampa. While they recommend further
testing and examination of the data, Loftin and McDowall (1984)
tentatively concluded that the Florida firearms law did not have a measurable
deterrent effect on violent crime. In a later paper, McDowall et al.
(1992) pooled the Detroit, Jacksonville, Tampa, and Miami time series
with data collected from a study examining the effects of Pennsylvania’s
1982 firearm sentencing enhancement law on violent crime in Pittsburgh
and Philadelphia. They found that these two cities showed significant reductions
in homicide associated with the passage of the law. The pooled
results led McDowall and his colleagues (1992) to very different concluCRIMINAL
sions from the city-level studies. The authors found that mandatory sentencing
laws significantly reduced the number of homicides, but the effects
of mandatory sentencing laws on assaults and robberies were inconclusive.
Nationwide studies have not found any crime prevention effects associated
with firearms sentence enhancements. Kleck (1991) conducted a crosssectional
analysis of 1980 data for 170 cities and found that the existence of
a firearms sentence enhancement law was not related to homicide, assault,
or robbery rates. However, as Marvell and Moody (1995) observe, crosssectional
designs are not suitable for studying short-term impacts, and it is
difficult to be confident that the control variables account for the numerous
differences between cities that may mask the laws’ impacts. In an attempt to
mitigate the methodological problems in earlier research studies, Marvell
and Moody (1995) conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of
firearms sentence enhancements on crime and prisons. The authors conducted
a pooled time-series, cross-sectional design analysis for nearly all
states over a period of 16 to 24 years such that, for each state, the other
states served as controls. They found little evidence to suggest that firearms
sentencing enhancements had any effects on crime rates or firearms use.
Moreover, the authors did not find any indication that these laws increased
prison admissions or prison populations.
Raphael and Ludwig (2003) observe that Richmond’s well-known
Project Exile program to deter illicit carrying of firearms by convicted
felons is essentially a firearms sentence enhancement initiative, as firearms
offenders are diverted from state to federal courts. At the heart of Project
Exile, all Richmond felon-in-possession cases are prosecuted in federal
courts, with the defendants facing a mandatory five-year prison sentence if
convicted. Project Exile also includes training for local law enforcement on
federal statutes and search and seizure procedures, a public relations campaign
to increase community involvement in fighting firearm-related crime,
and a massive advertising campaign intended to send the message of zero
tolerance for gun crime and to inform potential offenders of the swift and
certain federal sentence (Raphael and Ludwig, 2003). Advocates of the
program claim success based on a 40 percent decrease in Richmond firearm-
related homicides between 1997 and 1998.
In their evaluation of Project Exile, Raphael and Ludwig (2003) found
that the decline in Richmond firearm-related homicides would have been
likely to occur even in the absence of the program. The authors revealed
that nearly all of the reduction in Richmond firearm-related homicides
associated with Project Exile may be attributable to an unusually high level
of and increase in firearm-related homicide prior to the implementation of
the program. They also found little statistical evidence of an impact between
felon-in-possession convictions and city-level homicide rates. Their
null finding is robust to a variety of methodological adjustments, including
an analysis of omitted variable bias that uses juveniles, who are generally
exempt from federal felon-in-possession charges, as an additional in-city
control group. In his subsequent analysis of the Raphael-Ludwig data,
Levitt (2003) suggests that the expectations of a large decrease in crime
associated with Project Exile were probably unrealistic, given the small
number of additional felon-in-possession convictions per year (roughly 80)
and the small increase in total punishment in Richmond (240 extra personyears
of imprisonment that would be associated with an estimated 2.5
percent reduction in crime in Richmond). Greenwood (2003) also speculates
that Project Exile did not focus sufficiently on the most dangerous
offenders associated with the bulk of firearm-related crime in Richmond.