Affective and Instrumental Bases of Solidarity
According to Durkheim the nature of solidarity is the central problem
of sociology. This is the thread that runs through his whole work: what
are the ties uniting people to each other, he wondered in 1888, five years
before he wrote De la division du travail social, where he elaborates his
theory of solidarity (Lukes 1973).
Durkheim’s predecessors had already developed some ideas about the
social texture of society. In a work that predates Durkheim by a few
decades, Auguste Comte, for instance, describes the social equilibrium in
modern society as the result of the division of labor and occupational
specialization. But to Comte the principle of differentiation and specialization
also is a threat to feelings of community and togetherness. In contrast
to Comte, Herbert Spencer emphasizes the element of self-interest
involved in solidarity. In accordance with the tradition of British utilitarianism
and the thinking of Adam Smith, he regards social cohesion as
the result of the undisturbed interplay of individual interests; no shared
beliefs, norms, or state regulations are needed to realize cohesion and solidarity.
TЁonnies, the first to analyze the transformation of solidarity in the
nineteenth century, describes how in the transition from Gemeinschaft to
Gesellschaft the traditional community values as they were embodied in
the small-scale social unities of family, neighborhood, and village were
substituted by individualized feelings and needs. In the large-scale centralized
nation-state, social relationships had become dominated by economic
rationality and free competition between individual interests. In
contrast to Spencer, TЁonnies presents ag loomy picture of the rising capitalist
society, which could only be kept under control by a strong state.
Durkheim agrees with TЁonnies’s division into two types of society,
and also with his global characterization of Gemeinschaft. But while
TЁonnies describes Gesellschaft as a mechanical aggregate, Durkheim does
not conceive of premodern societies as more “organic” than contemporary
ones. According to him collective activity in more modern societies
is as spontaneous and natural as in more small-scale communities. In
the end Durkheim reverses TЁonnies’s terminology: he reserves the term
“mechanical solidarity” for the human ties that characterize traditional
societies, while using “organic solidarity” to describe modern forms of
community.He explains his choice for these terms as follows: mechanical
solidarity “does not signify that it is produced by mechanical and artificial
means. We call it that only by analogy to the cohesion which unites the
elements of an inanimate body, as opposed to that which makes a unity
out of the elements of a living body.” In the case of mechanical solidarity
“the social molecules . . . can act together only in the measure that they
have no actions of their own, as the molecules of inorganic bodies” (1964a
[1893]: 130).
Mechanical solidarity corresponds to a “system of homogeneous segments
that are similar to one another” (1964a [1893]: 181). Society comprises
such segments (families, clans, and territorial districts), which
are characterized by a very low degree of interdependence. There is no
fundamental distinction between individuals. Individual conscience is
dependent on the collective conscience, and individual identity is a part
of group identity. In mechanical solidarity human behavior is regulated
by the shared norms, sentiments, and values that form together the conscience
collective. This type of solidarity is reflected in the application of
severe penal sanctions – “repressive law” – to deviant behavior or the
violation of norms. Religion is a dominant factor in social life, and the
codes of morality are concrete and specific.
In more modern societies organic solidarity is gradually replacing mechanical
solidarity. Organic solidarity is based on individual difference.
The increased division of labor and occupational specialization at the
end of the nineteenth century brought about a differentiation in societal
tasks and functions comparable to the different functions of the bodily organs,
which analogy explains Durkheim’s “organic solidarity.” Durkheim
assumes a direct relationship between the degree of specialization of societal
functions and the extent of social cohesion: the more labor is divided
and the activity of each is specialized, “the stronger is the cohesion which
results from this solidarity” (1964a [1893]: 131). Or, in his organ terminology,
“the unity of the organism is as great as the individuation of the
parts is more marked” (131). There is ahig h level of mutual dependency.
Legal regulations determine the nature of and relationships between the
different societal tasks and functions. As the division of labor extends,
the conscience collective weakens: its content becomes increasingly secular
and human-oriented, and morality is becoming more abstract and
universal. It is important to bear in mind that Durkheim regards the
distinction between the solidarity types as an analytical one and, in fact,
as two aspects of the same reality that are rarely entirely separate.
In line with TЁonnies’s distinction between Gemeinschaft and GesellschaftMaxWeber
distinguishes between communal and associative social
relationships. When people’s action – either individual or collective – is
based on the subjective feeling of togetherness,Weber speaks of communal
relationships. This feeling may stemfromaffection or from tradition,
but it is essential that more than the mere feeling of togetherness is involved.
“It is only when this feeling leads to amutual orientation of their
behaviour to each other that a social relationship arises between them”
(1947 [1922]: 138). Associative relationships are at issue when the orientation
of action springs from a rationally motivated correspondence
between interests. This rationality may be inspired either by certain absolute
values or by instrumental and utilitarian considerations. An example
is market exchange, consisting of a compromise between opposed
but complementary interests. Another example is the purely voluntary
association between individuals on the basis of their self-interest; or the
voluntary association of individuals sharing certain values.
Different from associative relationships, communal relationships
have an affective, emotional, or traditional basis – for example, religious
fraternities, erotic relationships, personal loyalty, or the esprit de corps
within the military. The most typical communal relationship is the family,
according to Weber. Most social relationships possess this affective
component but are at the same time determined by associational factors.
“No matter how calculating and hard-headed the ruling considerations
in such a social relationship – as that of a merchant to his customers –
may be, it is quite possible for it to involve emotional values which transcend
its utilitarian significance” (1947 [1922]: 137). Like DurkheimWeber
stresses the impossibility of ast rict distinction between the different types
of social relationship: they are ideal types. In everyday practice any social
relationship that transcends the pursuit of immediate interests and
is of a longer duration generates enduring social bonds, which cannot
be reduced to mere utilitarian considerations. The reverse is also true:
within communal relationships actions may sometimes be inspired by
utilitarian motives.
The American sociologist Talcott Parsons is clearly inspired by these
founding fathers of sociology (1952, 1977). For instance, Durkheim’s emphasis
on the contribution of common values to the integration of social
systems can be recognized in The Social System (1952). In this book
Parsons distinguishes loyalty from solidarity. He considers loyalty the
noninstitutionalized precursor of solidarity: the individual motivation
to conform to the interests or expectations of another person. Only
when these expectations have become an institutionalized obligation
can we speak of solidarity. Inasmuch as these roles are institutionalized,
solidarity with the collectivity of which one is a part is involved.
Also Parsons returns to TЁonnies’s terminology in his differentiation between
certain types of collectivity: “A collectivity in which expressive
interests have primacy in its orientation to continual action in concert
may . . . be called a Gemeinschaft; one in which instrumental interests
have primacy is an ‘organization’” (1952: 100). LikeDurkheim andWeber,
Parsons acknowledges the possibility of mixtures between Gemeinschaft
and Gesellschaft, for instance, in relationships between the incumbents
of certain professional roles and their clients: universalism, functional
specificity, and affective neutrality – characteristics of Gesellschaft – go
along with the obligation implied in the profession to serve the community,
irrespective of any financial considerations.
Parsons does not develop a full-blown theory of solidarity. However,
he does have a clear-cut opinion on the basis of solidarity: “I should like
to suggest that the primary ‘cement’ which makes such groups solidary is
affective ties” (1952: 157). In the process of socialization within the family
the child develops its first affective ties. This is the basis of the formation
of an internalized capacity to affectivity that can be transferred to objects
outside the family. Affectivity is, according to Parsons, a “generalized
medium” comparable with money, power, and influence.
From these various sociological accounts two main types of solidarity
come to the fore, whose bases are only seemingly in opposition to each
other. They are brought together in the following scheme:
Gemeinschaft Gesellschaft
mechanical solidarity organic solidarity
communal relationships associative relationships
expressive relationships instrumental relationships
One may feel tempted to associate the left column with preindustrial
society in which small homogeneous communities are tied together by
strong feelings of solidarity, and to regard the right column as the prototype
of modern solidarity as it has evolved in industrialized society.
The underlying assumptions about human nature involve, on the one
hand, homo sociologicus, the individual as embedded in small-scale social
relationships, and whose solidary behavior is based on internalized
moral obligations and, on the other hand, homo economicus, the rational,
market-oriented individual, whose moral codes are abstract and universal.
Solidarity is synonymous, here,with promoting the collective interest
of mutually dependent individuals.
As we have seen, such a simplified dichotomy is not found in the
works of the classical authors just discussed. Although most of them
distinguish different types of solidarity, they all emphasize that these
types are not mutually exclusive and, indeed, often occur together in
varying combinations. The idea that the two types of solidarity do not
exclude each other seems to have been lost in more modern theories, as I
argue in a moment, after discussing some other classical anthropological
and sociological contributions.