Reciprocity andMorality as Bases of Social Ties
Malinowski’s detailed account of the Kula ritual – the pattern of ceremonial
gift exchange among the population of the Trobriand archipelago
discussed in Chapter 3 – describes a continuous gift exchange that takes
place between the inhabitants of these islands. It follows a fixed pattern
with articles of two kinds constantly traveling in opposite directions and
constantly being exchanged. Every detail of the transactions is fixed and
regulated by a set of rules and conventions. Most important is that the
gifts keep moving through the archipelago: a gift should never stagnate.
The issue is not the durable possession of certain articles but the principle
of exchange itself. The ever continuing movement of the objects from
one (temporary) owner to the next is crucial in the process of acquiring
a personal and social identity, status, and prestige and of creating social
ties.
Malinowski proposes a continuum of feelings involved in gift giving.
Pure gifts, altruistic gifts for which nothing is expected in return, and gifts
that can be characterized as barter or forms of exchange where personal
profit is the dominant motive, are the exceptions.Most typical are motives
that lie in between these extremes. More or less equivalent reciprocity,
attended by clear expectations of returns, is the general rule underlying
gift exchange. According to Malinowski this economic dimension
of gift giving corresponds with the sociological dimension of kinship:
gifts to kin and partners are more often given disinterestedly, whereas
more or less direct expectations of returns and elements of barter are
more characteristic of gifts given to persons farther away in the kinship
hierarchy.
Like his master Durkheim, Marcel Mauss takes a critical stance toward
the then prevailing utilitarian strands in political theory by emphasizing
the values of altruism and solidarity. However, he goes beyond
Durkheim’s conceptions of solidarity as based on collective representations
or on the mutual dependency implied in the division of labor, by
discovering gift exchange as the mechanism that reconciles individual interests
and the creation of a social system.Mauss radicalizesMalinowski’s
insights by stating that do ut des is the principal rule in all gift giving. In
his view, there are no free gifts: “Generosity and self-interest are linked in
giving” (1990 [1923]: 68). He considers gift exchange as a subtle mixture
of altruism and selfishness. Customs of potlatch – rivalrous gift giving in
order to gain status and power (see Chapter 1) – illustrate this mixture
in its most extreme form. Giving is not only a material act but also a
symbolic medium involving strong moral obligations to give in return.
By means of giving mutually it becomes possible to communicate with
other people, to help them, and to create alliances. Gift exchange is at
the basis of a system of mutual obligations between people and, as such,
functions as the moral cement of human society and culture, according
to Mauss.
In a work written some decades later, Lґevi-Strauss (1961 [1949]) develops
these insights further by considering the principle of reciprocity
as a social structure determining our values, feelings, and actions. This
is illustrated, for example, by the exchange of women by men in some
non-Western societies. The principle of reciprocity is not limited to socalled
primitive societies but also applies toWestern society, according to
Lґevi-Strauss. He mentions examples in the sphere of offering food and
the exchange of presents at Christmas. Forms of potlatch occur in our
own society aswell; for instance, the exhibition of Christmas cards on our
mantelpiece and the vanity ofmuch gift giving exemplify the destruction
of wealth as a means to express or gain prestige. Far from being neutral
objects without any special symbolic value, gifts are “vehicles and instruments
for realities of another order: influence, power, sympathy, status,
emotion; and the skilful game of exchange consists of a complex totality
of manoeuvres, conscious or unconscious, in order to gain security and
to fortify one’s self against risks incurred through alliances and rivalry”
(1965: 86).
Lґevi-Strauss makes the important distinction between “restricted exchange,”
involving only two partners, and “generalized exchange,” which
refers to a more complex structure of exchange relationships. The concept
of generalized exchange has been reconsidered by Sahlins (1972), who distinguishes
between “generalized,” “balanced,” and “negative” reciprocity
and richly illustrates these different forms with ethnographic materials.
In generalized reciprocity – the disinterested extreme – the expectation
of returns is indefinite, and returns are not stipulated by time, quantity,
or quality. Like Gouldner andMalinowski, Sahlins mentions the circle of
near kin and loved ones as an example. Feelings of altruism and solidarity
supposedly accompany this type of exchange. Balanced reciprocity is less
personal and refers to direct and equivalent exchangewithoutmuchdelay.
It is more likely in relationships that are more emotionally distant. Feelings
of mutual obligation go together with balanced reciprocity. Sahlins
describes negative reciprocity – the unsociable extreme – as the “attempt
to get something for nothing” (1972: 195). He summarizes his model as
“kindred goes with kindness,” and “close kin tend to share, to enter in
generalized exchanges, and distant and nonkin to deal in equivalents or
in guile” (Sahlins 1972: 196, quoting Tylor).
Conscious or unconscious expectations of reciprocity not only bring
social relations about; they also stabilize already existing relations by making
them predictable to a certain extent. In his essay “Faithfulness and
gratitude,” Simmel (1950 [1908]) analyzes the moral and social importance
of these two feelings for sustaining reciprocity in human relationships.
The different psychological motives on which social relations can
be based, such as love, hate, and passion, are in themselves not sufficient
to keep these relations alive. Simmel considers faithfulness – a kind of
loyalty or commitment – a necessary feeling contributing to the continuity
of an already existing social relationship. Faithfulness is what he calls
a “sociological feeling,” oriented to the relation as such, in contrast to the
more person-oriented feelings like love, hate, or friendship. Gratitude is,
just like faithfulness, a powerful means to establish social cohesion, as
has been argued in Chapter 3. This is why Simmel calls gift giving “one of
the strongest sociological functions”: without it society would not come
about.
Also Alvin Gouldner explores the “norm of reciprocity” as a mechanism
to start social relationships. This norm helps to create social interaction
“for it can reduce an actor’s hesitancy to be the first to part
with his valuables and thus enable exchange to get underway” (1973a:
255). Although equivalence and mutuality can be powerful motives to
exchange gifts, Gouldner, following Simmel, points to the fact that reciprocity
does not necessarily mean equivalence. However, Gouldner goes
further than Simmel by reflecting more explicitly on the complicating
role of power in reciprocity relations and by elaborating it theoretically.
As we have seen in Chapter 3, reciprocal exchange relationships
may be very asymmetrical. In addition to the norm of reciprocity,
Gouldner distinguishes the “norm of beneficence,” or the norm of giving
“something for nothing” (Malinowski’s “free gift”): the expression
of real altruism. This kind of giving is not a reaction to gifts received
from others. It is a powerful correction mechanism in situations where
existing social relationships have become disturbed, or where people
need care or help. Paradoxically, says Gouldner, “There is no gift that
brings ahig her return than the free gift, the gift given with no strings
attached. For that which is truly given freely moves men deeply and
makes them most indebted to their benefactors. In the end, if it is reciprocity
that holds the mundane world together, it is beneficence that
transcends thisworld and can make menweep the tears of reconciliation”
(1973b: 277).
Despite clear-cut differences in approach, Simmel,Malinowski,Mauss,
Lґevi-Strauss, Gouldner, and Sahlins all seem to stress the same point: gifts
are the moral cement of culture and society. Although powermay complicate
the principle of reciprocity, the primordial meaning of gift exchange
is to start or to stabilize social relationships. An interesting parallel with
the ideas of Durkheim,Weber, and Parsons, who do not somuch oppose
but rather juxtapose communal and instrumental relationship types, is
that self-interest and the creation of social order are not regarded as contradictory.
Generosity and self-interest go hand in hand in gift exchange,
and it is exactly this combination that fosters the development of social
order.
Modern Theory:Splitt ing Up Affection and Utility
In more modern conceptualizations of solidarity, two approaches have
come into existence, the one stressing instrumental and utilitarian motives,
the other considering norms, values, and emotions as the bases
of solidarity. Authors like Hechter (1987), Coleman (1986), Elster (1989),
Raub (1997), Lindenberg (1998), and (very differently) de Swaan (1988)
are representatives of the first tradition, whereas scholars such asMayhew
(1971) and Etzioni (1988) can be said to advance the second approach.
Solidarity and Rational Choice Theory
Rational choice theorists differ with regard to the centrality of the role of
self-interest in their theories. Some allow for other motivations as well.
John Elster (1989), for instance, thinks that, in addition to self-interest,
altruism, envy, and social norms are also contributing to social order,
stability, and cooperation. Other rational choice theorists, though, regard
self-interest as the prevailing motivation in determining an actor’s choices
between various action possibilities. One of the best-known theories of
solidarity based on this latter view of rational choice isMichaelHechter’s.
In his Principles of Group Solidarity (1987) he objects to three sociological
traditions of thinking about solidarity: the normativistic, functionalist,
and structuralist vision.
The first perspective, embodied in the work of Durkheim and Parsons,
considers order as the result of internalized group norms. From the functionalist
perspective that Hechter associates, for instance, with Elster,
solidarity is explained by the survival value of certain forms of solidary
behavior, whereas in the structuralist vision certain societal structures –
for instance, patterns of stratification – are seen as the cause of group solidarity.
Marx and Simmel provide examples of this approach. InHechter’s
view, none of these approaches can explain differences in the degree to
which people feel tied to the group or under which conditions group
members will or will not conform to their obligations toward the group.
The starting point of his own rational choice approach of solidarity is
that individuals are “bearers of sets of given, discrete, nonambiguous, and
transitive preferences” (1987: 30). In a situation where they can choose
between alternative possibilities of action, they will always choose that
alternative that presumably brings them the greatest profit.As profit maximizers,
rational individuals are supposed to behave coherently and to
be goal-oriented; they are, in brief, “rational egoists.” Institutions play
a regulating role, because they keep control of individual behavior by
means of the rules they have developed.
An important factor explaining the extent to which people feel tied
to a group is their dependency on the group for the satisfaction of their
needs. In its turn, dependency is influenced by the availability of alternative
resources for need satisfaction, the available information about
these resources, the costs involved in leaving the group, and the strength
of the personal ties among group members. The greater the dependency
of the members, the stronger the group ties and obligations felt toward
the group. The strength of group ties, however, is not enough to explain
solidary behavior. Solidarity presupposes that people are in fact committing
themselves to the group’s ends and do not become “free riders.”
Compliance requires formal controls, a group’s means to counteract free
riding. The group must have sufficient resources in order to be able to
punish or reward its members effectively depending on their contribution
to the group.
A similar perspective is found in the work of Coleman (1986). How
can individual interests be reconciledwith collective rationality?Coleman
and Fararo (1992: xi–xii) describe as the principal aim of rational choice
theory “to understand how actions that are reasonable or rational for
actors can combine to produce social outcomes, sometimes intended by
actors, sometimes unintended, sometimes socially optimal, sometimes
non-optimal.” The Dutch tradition of theoretical sociology also departs
from a rational choice perspective in its focus on the interdependency of
actors and the intended and unintended consequences of their behavior.
Raub (1997: 23) argues, for instance, that, if we assume that “actors act
according to their interests and that the interests of actors are their own
interests,” people will coordinate their actions while acknowledging interdependency
with other actors in order to reach their economic and
social goals.
The tension between individual and collective interests and rationality
is also central to de Swaan’s study about the rise of collective forms of
solidarity in Europe and the United States (1988).Which are the indirect
consequences of the misfortunes of some people for others who do not
suffer directly from these misfortunes? Using diverging theoretical perspectives
like Elias’s civilization theory and Olson’s theory on the logic of
collective action, de Swaan analyzes the historical process in which people
have become more and more dependent on each other, and the implications
of this process for social solidarity. As interdependency networks
became more extended, ramified, and complex, the influence of people’s
actions on others who took part in the same networks increased. Greater
mutual dependency implies that the needs of some – caused by poverty,
illness, or a lack of education – come to represent a threat to others who
suffer less fromthese misfortunes. Poverty, for instance, meant a threat to
public order, epidemics were threatening the lives of healthy individuals
as well, and low education involved the risk of social exclusion of some,
and therefore social instability for all. Therefore, it was in the rational
self-interest of the privileged citizens to contribute financially and to arrange
collective welfare facilities. The general access of these collective
goods and the risk of free riding and abuse were the reasons for the development
of the system of state-based care where everybody is equally
obliged to contribute to the collective good.