Recognition of the Other
The anthropological theory of the gift can be considered a theory of
humansolidarity, aswe have seen. The principle of reciprocity underlying
gift exchange proved to be the fundament of human society. It contains
themoral basis for the development of social ties and solidarity because its
implicit assumption is the recognition of the other person as a potential
ally. The social and cultural system on which archaic societies were based
rested on themutual acceptance of the other as a partner in gift exchange.
Recognition of the other as a human being proves to be an essential
precondition for the coming into being of patterns of exchange.Without
recognition of the person and his or her identity no reciprocal exchange
is possible.
The significance of recognition of the other returns in the accounts of
both contemporary and classical thinkers. For instance, Honneth (1992)
conceives of reciprocity as an issue of recognition. In order to be able to
feel self-respect, people need the respect and regard of others.We recognize
Adam Smith’s and George Herbert Mead’s views on the mirroring
of the imaginary viewpoint of the other in our own minds. Honneth distinguishes
between three forms of intersubjective recognition – through
love, life, and law – resulting in three layers of self-regard. In love people
are experiencing a fundamental sense of being valued as an individual. In
social life humans are valued and respected because of personal characteristics
that are socially valued. In law, finally, people are valued regardless
of their personal characteristics and regardless of the social value of these
characteristics. Similarly Habermas (1989) regards identity as the result
of processes of mutual recognition, and reciprocal recognition as a basic
assumption underlying solidarity. According to him the basic principles
of modern solidarity are not fundamentally different from the mutual
expectations of reciprocity existing in premodern societies.
Also inHannah Arendt’s view (1978) adoption of the plurality of other
people’s viewpoints in our own minds is the only way to transcend our
own, interest-driven self and the limitations of our own judgment. In addition,
Arendt provides uswith some poignant premonitions concerning
the emotions on which solidarity is sometimes built. Compassion and
pitywith the societal underclasses are often important motiveswithin revolutionarymovements.
InOnRevolution (1963) she presents a fascinating
analysis of the role of solidarity and pity during the French Revolution.
The revolutionaries, with Robespierre in their vanguard, were driven by
pity for the mass of the poor and exploited people; they idealized the poor
and praised their suffering as a source of virtue. The revolutionaries’ pity
became a pretext for the exercise of brute power, resulting in the ruthless
annihilation of the opponents of the revolution. The revolutionary solidarity
was based on a lack of recognition of others as human beings and
of the plurality of their viewpoints.
Recognition of the humanity of self and other is tantamount to recognition
of the interdependency of self and other. For the recognition of
humanity implies that other people’s needs and theirmutual dependency
for the fulfillment of these needs are recognized. In Chapter 8 we argued
that the psychological development of the assertive self may be at odds
with the capacity to recognize the other and the awareness of mutual
dependency. The precarious position of civil solidarity can largely be explained
by the fact that its fundamental precondition – recognition of
otherness – seems to be subject to erosion.