Motives for Solidarity
In classical sociological theory solidarity motives were thought to be
either inspired by affectivity and shared norms and values, or by instrumental
considerations like self-interest and rational choice. An example
of the first is the emotional commitment people feel toward their close
relatives; solidarity based on self-interest becomes visible, for instance,
in the collective arrangements of the welfare state: contributing collectively
is to the advantage of every individual citizen. A striking difference
between anthropological and sociological theory is the anthropologists’
attention paid to the principle of give-and-take, whereby each individual
gives about equally. The best illustration of the enormous significance
of this equality motive is still found in the anthropological literature on
gift exchange. Malinowski’s account of the Kula shows that the bulk of
the transactions between the inhabitants of the Trobriand Islands are of
the equality type. As noted in Chapter 2, it appears that also in Western
society the most common pattern is that the gift is followed by a more or
less equal countergift. The underlying motivation is in Mauss’s terms
do ut des, I give so that you give in return. This is also the basis of
the many forms of mutual help and types of local solidarity discussed
in Chapter 8. Perhaps the “normalcy” of this type of solidarity is the
reason why it has received such scarce attention in the sociological
literature.
Another possible motivation for solidarity particularly emphasized by
anthropologists is power. Both Mauss and Lґevi-Strauss showed how the
power motive could be involved in gift exchange: gifts can serve to reinforce
the personal prestige and status of the giver, but also to humiliate
or dominate the other party by putting him in a position of debt and
dependence. Later these insights were elaborated upon by the sociologist
Gouldner, but the anthropologists had clearly preceded him. It is obvious
that power can be a forceful motive sustaining mutual solidarity,
but there are various shades. A very strong internal group loyalty does
not necessarily lead to the exercise of power and oppression. Thinking in
terms of “us” and “them” can be observed in rival football clubs but also
in groups with different religious convictions or cultural backgrounds.
The relationship between the autochthonous population and the newcomers
in Western societies illustrates the possible consequences. The
more one exclusively identifies with one’s own group and refrains from
interaction with outsiders, the more negative effects on the outside world
the intragroup solidarity will have, and the less the willingness to engage
in intergroup cooperation and trust.
Groups tied by strong ethnic or nationalist identifications, as it
were, need inimical other groups for their own survival. Their selfidentification
derives its legitimacy from the identification of other
groups as the enemy. In extreme cases hate can breed the lust for power.
The aim of the group becomes self-preservation through the oppression
of outsiders by means of violence and destruction. The former
Yugoslavia is one of the many examples showing how nationalist or ethnic
pride and strong mutual solidarity can turn into ethnic cleansing
and violent oppression. In his book Blood and Belonging (1993) Michael
Ignatieff explores the numerous forms of new tribalism and nationalism
in our globalized world. The use of violence is legitimized by the perceived
threat to self-determination or the love for one’s own blood and
soil. The latter legitimization is perhaps the most convincing as it appeals
to the supposedly better parts of human nature. In Ignatieff ’swords: “But
if nationalism legitimizes an appeal to blood loyalty, and in turn blood
sacrifice, it can only do so persuasively if it seems to appeal to people’s
better natures, and not just to their worst instincts. Since killing is not a
business to be taken lightly, it must be done for a reason which makes its
perpetrator think well of himself. If violence is to be legitimated, it must
be in the name of all that is best in a people, and what is better than their
love of home?” (1993: 6). Solidarity springing from feelings of “blood and
belonging” is the most perverted of all solidarities. Self-interest is not a
sufficient motive to explain this type of solidarity. The need to protect
one’s own group ideals and identity by oppressing others through exercising
power and using violence is predominant here. This type of solidarity
is based on the complete denial of the humanness of the other party.
Different from what modern sociology suggests, four broad categories
of motives seem to underlie solidarity: affection, equality, power, and
instrumentality or self-interest. Solidarity theory, then, would gain by
adding equality and power to the more common motives of affectivity
and instrumentality.